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This  paper  constructs  a  theoretical  model  to  show  how  the  credibility  of  a 
country’s  commitment  to  an  international  gold  standard  regime  is  driven  by 
fundamental  determinants  such  as:  1)  shifts  in  domestic  policy,  2)  a  breakdown 
in  cooperation  between  central  banks,  and  3)  unilateral  devaluations  by 
foreign  central  banks.  Because  the  credibility  of  the  gold  standard  regime  is 
an  important  determinant  of  domestic  interest  rate  uncertainty,  the  latter  is 
endogenously  linked  to  changes  in  the  fundamental  determinants. 
Applying  this  analysis  to  the  inter-war  period,  the  paper  shows  that  GARCH 
measures  of  interest  rate  uncertainty  rose  dramatically  in  the  U.S.  during  the 
early  1930s  and  that  movements  in  this  series  can  be  explained  by  events  which 
affected  the  credibility  of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  gold  standard.  Also, 
interest  rate  uncertainty  explains  a  great  deal  of  the  variation  in  aggregate 
output  and  its  components  during  the  interwar  period.  Thus  there  is  evidence 
that  the  breakdown  in  the  gold  standard  contributed  to  the  Great  Depression  by 
injecting  increased  uncertainty  into  the  U.S.  economy. I.  Introduction 
Economists  have  begun  to  re-examine  the  role  that  the  international  gold 
1 
standard  played  in  bringing  about  the  Great  Depression.’  Much  of  this  work 
points  to  a  breakdown  in  international  cooperation  and  reduced  credibility  of 
the  gold  standard  regime  as  the  principal  source  of  world-wide  economic 
contraction.  For  example,  Temin  (1989)  has  argued  that  the  gold  standard 
imparted  a  deflationary  bias  on  the  world  economy  because  policy  adjustments 
of  gold  standard  countries  were  asymmetric;  deflationary  policies  pursued  by 
countries  suffering  from  balance-of-payments  deficits  were  not  offset  by 
expansionary  policies  in  surplus  countries.  Moreover,  Eichengreen  (1992) 
contends  that  reduced  credibility  of  the  gold  standard  regime  intensified 
deflationary  forces  by  forcing  policy  authorities  to  pursue  increasingly 
restrictive  measures  to  defend  exchange  rate  parities. 
The  breakdown  in  international  cooperation  and  loss  of  credibility  have 
been  attributed  to  several  factors.  Some  scholars  contend  that  the  absence  of 
a  hegemonic  central  bank  -  such  as  the  Bank  of  England  during  the  prewar 
gold  standard  -  to  coordinate  world  monetary  policy  was  responsible  for  the 
breakdown  in  cooperation.2  Others  argue  that  the  exchange  rate  parities  set 
when  the  gold  standard  regime  was  reestablished  in  1926  did  not  reflect  the 
disparate  inflation  rates  experienced  by  participant  countries  since  World  War 
I3  .  These  fixed  rates  implied  balance-of-payments  disequilibria  and  lead  to 
an  environment  of  de-stabilizing  speculation  with  investors  anticipating 
realignment.  4  Finally,  Eichengreen  concludes  that  a  shift  in  the  post-WWI 
political  landscape  made  it  difficult  for  central  banks  to  coordinate  their 
actions  and  reduced  the  credibility  of  the  interwar  gold  standard  regime. 
With  a  disruption  in  the  existing  social  contracts  regarding  the  distribution 
of  fiscal  burdens  and  with  labor  gaining  political  power,  it  became  less  clear 
1 whether  maintaining  external  balance  would  remain  the  focus  of  policy  as  it 
had  in  the  prewar  era.  The  credibility  of  the  regime  was  further  reduced  by  a 
breakdown  in  international  cooperation  which  was  driven  by:  a)  objections  of 
domestic  interest  groups  who  had  gained  political,  b)  disputes  over  war 
reparations,  and  c)  disparate  conceptual  frameworks  of  policy-makers.  The 
net  impact  of  these  political  changes  was  that  the  fixed  exchange  rates  were 
no  longer  perceived  by  the  public  to  be  equilibrium  rates  and  de-stabilizing 
speculation  resulted.5 
While  there  is  disagreement  in  the  literature  concerning  the  source  of  the 
breakdown  in  the  gold  standard,  there  is  less  discord  about  the  nature  of  the 
transmission  mechanism  through  which  the  breakdown  affected  the  real  economy. 
In  particular,  the  literature  has  focused  on  the  stance  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
policy  called  for  by  adherence  to  the  gold  standard’s  “rules  of  the  game”  as 
the  primary  determinant  of  economic  activity.  For  example,  Eichengreen  argues 
that  adherence  to  the  gold  standard  caused  contractionary  monetary  policies  in 
the  U.S  and  France  in  1928  to  be  quickly  exported  to  other  countries.  These 
countries  were  prevented  from  undertaking  unilateral  money  supply  expansions 
or  increases  in  public  spending  because  such  policies  would  produce  balance- 
of-payments  deficits  and  threaten  their  ability  to  stay  on  the  gold  standard.’ 
The  loss  of  credibility  magnified  the  problem  because  it  meant  that  policy- 
makers  had  to  pursue  increasingly  restrictive  policies  to  defend  the  exchange 
rate  parities. 
This  paper  focuses  on  an  additional  transmission  mechanism  through  which 
the  collapse  of  the  gold  standard  affected  the  U.S.  economy  during  the 
inter-war  period:  the  uncertainty  channel.  It  is  argued  that  the  breakdown  in 
international  cooperation  and  loss  of  credibility  in  the  gold  standard  regime 
injected  considerable  interest  rate  uncertainty  into  the  U.S.  economy  and  that 
this  uncertainty  depressed  aggregate  spending.  The  loss  of  credibility  forced 
2 policy  authorities  to  initiate  dramatic  shifts  in  policy  instruments  to  defend 
exchange  rate  parities  and  these  adjustments  not  only  affected  the  stance  of 
monetary  policy,  but  the  volatility  of  policy  as  well. 
At  a  theoretical  level  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  uncertainty 
affected  economic  activity  during  the  Great  Depression.  First,  the  literature 
on  financial  intermediation  under  asymmetric  information  shows  that  credit 
rationing  increases  and  the  risk  premium  charged  by  lenders  rises  when 
investment  projects  become  riskier.7  Second,  recent  work  on  irreversible 
investment  decisions  shows  that  investment  spending  is  highly  sensitive  to 
uncertainty  when  investment  expenditures  are  sunk  costs.*  In  particular, 
Ingersoll  and  Ross  (1992)  demonstrate  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  plays  as 
important  a  role  (if  not  more  important)  in  the  determination  of  investment 
spending  as  the  level  of  interest  rates. 
While  this  transmission  mechanism  differs  greatly  from  that  which  has  been 
emphasized  in  the  literature,  it  has  been  discussed  by  other  scholars.  For 
example,  Hamilton  (1988)  speculates  that: 
speculators  anticipate  changes  in  the  terms  of  gold  convertibility. 
This  institutionalizes  a  system  susceptible  to  large  and  sudden 
inflows  and  outflows  of  capital  and  to  destabilizing  monetary  policy 
if  monetary  authorities  must  resort  to  great  extremes  to  reestablish 
credibility.  Such  a  system  requires  individuals  to  adapt  their 
behavior  to  the  contingencies  of  rapid  and  dramatic  changes  in 
interest  rates,  credit  availability,  and  price  levels.  This 
characterizes  the  events  of  1931  most  accurately.  Surely,  it 
contributed  to  propagating  the  Great  Depression. 
Moreover,  Ferderer  and  Zalewski  (1993)  provide  evidence  that  interest  rate 
uncertainty  -  measured  by  the  risk  premium  embedded  in  the  term  structure  of 
interest  rates  -  rose  in  response  to  the  breakdown  of  the  gold  standard  and 
helps  explain  the  decline  in  investment  spending  during  the  Great  Depression. 
The  present  paper  extends  this  earlier  work  in  several  directions.  First, 
we  construct  a  theoretical  model  to  show  how  credibility  of  the  gold  standard 
regime  (i.e.,  the  probability  that  existing  parities  will  be  maintained  and 
3 devaluation  will  not  occur)  is  linked  to  various  economic  fundamentals.  These 
include:  a)  shifts  in  domestic  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  b)  breakdowns  in 
cooperation  between  central  banks,  and  c)  unilateral  devaluations  by  foreign 
central  banks.  Second,  we  show  that  domestic  interest  rate  uncertainty  arises 
as  an  endogenous  response  to  reduced  credibility  of  the  gold  standard  regime. 
Thus  we  formally  demonstrate  that  changing  political  forces  can  affect  the 
credibility  of  the  gold  standard  and  uncertainty  about  domestic  interest  rate. 
The  third  contribution  of  the  paper  is  empirical.  Using  a  Generalized 
Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedastic  (GARCH)  measure  of  interest  rate 
uncertainty,  we  show  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  rose  to  unprecedented 
levels  in  the  U.S.  during  the  early  1930s.  Moreover,  an  examination  of  the 
historical  record  suggests  that  behavior  of  interest  rate  uncertainty  during 
this  time  is  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  theoretical  model.  For 
example,  interest  rate  uncertainty  rose  in  the  U.S.  following  Britain’s 
departure  from  the  gold  standard  (and  devaluation  of  the  pound)  in  late  1932 
and  following  attempts  at  monetary  expansion  in  1932  and  1933. 
The  final  contribution  of  the  paper  is  also  empirical.  It  is  shown  that 
interest  rate  uncertainty  does  about  as  well  as  monetary  variables  in 
explaining  fluctuations  in  aggregate  output  and  its  components  (particularly 
equipment  investment)  during  the  inter-war  perhx19  Moreover,  much  of  the 
variation  in  the  money  multiplier  during  the  inter-war  period  can  be  explained 
by  movements  in  interest  rate  uncertainty.  Taken  together,  these  findings 
support  the  hypothesis  that  increased  uncertainty  depressed  economic  activity 
during  the  1930s  by  inducing  firms  to  delay  investment  expenditures  and  by 
restricting  the  level  of  financial  intermediation. 
The  outline  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the 
theoretical  model.  Estimation  of  the  interest  rate  uncertainty  measure  is 
discussed  in  section  III.  Section  IV  examines  the  historical  record  to 
4 determine  if  there  is  a  link  between  interest  rate  uncertainty  and  events 
which  the  theoretical  model  predicts  should  affect  uncertainty.  Section  V 
presents  results  from  empirical  models  which  compare  the  power  of  monetary  and 
uncertainty  variables  for  explaining  output  fluctuations  during  the  inter-war 
period.  The  final  section  concludes  the  paper  and  discusses  the  policy 
implications. 
II.  The  Model 
The  first  part  of  this  section  examines  the  factors  which  determine  the 
credibility  of  a  country’s  commitment  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime.  The 
speculative  attack  model  of  Blanco  and  Garber  (1986)  is  utilized  for  this 
purpose.  The  second  part  of  this  section  shows  how  the  credibility  of  the 
commitment  affects  domestic  interest  rate  uncertainty. 
A.  The  Basic  Structure 
Under  the  international  gold  standard  a  country  is  required  to  fix  the 
value  of  its  currency  in  terms  of  gold  and  stand  ready  to  buy  and  sell  gold 
unconditionally  at  that  price.  When  each  participant  country  sets  a  fixed 
price  for  gold,  exchange  rates  become  fixed.  For  example,  let  jj$  =  log($/oz.) 
be  the  log  of  the  fixed  (denoted  by  the  bar)  dollar  price  of  an  ounce  of  gold 
and  g;E =  log(E/oz.)  the  log  of  the  fixed  sterling  price  of  gold.  Then  the  log 
of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  (the  domestic  price  of  foreign  currency)  is: 
e,  =  i$,,  -  &., 
The  exchange  rate  remains  fixed  as  long  as  each  country  maintains  a  fixed 
price  of  gold.  Also,  the  absence  of  arbitrage  opportunities  ensures  that 
exchange  rates  prevailing  in  secondary  markets  converge  to  this  official  rate. 
An  important  building  block  for  this  model  is  the  domestic  money  market. 
5 Equilibrium  in  the  money  market  implies: 
m 
t  -  P,  =  P  +  QY t  -  ait+  w t  (2. 
where  mt,  p,  and  y,  are  logarithms  of  the  money  stock,  domestic  price  level, 
and  aggregate  output,  respectively;  it  is  the  domestic  interest  rate;  p,  !2, 
and  a  are  parameters;  and  w t  is  a  stochastic  money  demand  shock.  Assuming 
covered  interest  rate  parity, 
i  =  i* 
t  t 
+  Etet+,  -  6 
t 
where  i:  is  the  foreign  interest  rate  and  Et  is  the  market’s  expectation 
conditional  on  information  available  at  time  t.  Finally,  the  domestic  price 
level  is  given  by 
(2.2) 
P,  =  PI  +  et  (2.3) 
where  p:  is  the  logarithm  of  the  foreign  price  level. 
the 
for 
We  abstract  from  the  banking  system  so  that  the  money  supply  is  equal  to 
monetary  base.  Moreover,  we  can  express  the  consolidated  balance  sheet 
the  domestic  economy’s  banking  system  as: 
m t  =  logCDt + G;exp(i,)l  (2.4) 
where  Dt  is  the  domestic  credit  component  of  the  monetary  base 10  and  Gt  is  the 
stock  of  gold  reserves  expressed  in  ounces  of  gold.  The  gold  stock  is  valued 
at  the  official  fixed  price  of  gold.  To  simplify  the  analysis,  we  abstract 
from  central  bank  holdings  of  foreign  currency  as  a  reserve  asset. 
6 B.  Policy  Rules 
In  a  small  open  economy  operating  under  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  the 
domestic  money  stock  and  interest  rate  are  driven  by  events  occurring  in  the 
rest  of  the  world.  Given  equation  (2.4),  this  implies  that  changes  in  the 
domestic  credit  component  of  the  money  stock  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the 
stock  of  gold  held  by  the  central  bank.  Thus  the  behavior  of  domestic  credit 
must  be  specified  to  pin  down  the  behavior  of  the  gold  stock. 
The  policy  rule  for  domestic  credit  creation  is  specified  so  that  Dt  is 
determined  exclusively  by  the  need  to  accommodate  fiscal  policy.  We  assume 
that  Dt  evolves  according  to  the  following  deterministic  process 
D  =  bD  t  t-l  (2.5) 
where  b  is  a  policy  parameter.  If  the  government’s  deficit  is  growing  over 
time,  then  b  >  1. 
The  policy  rule  for  devaluation  is  determined  by  the  behavior  of  the  gold 
stock.  As  long  as  the  central  bank  has  a  stock  of  gold  in  excess  of  some 
critical  level,  G,  the  official  price  of  gold  can  be  maintained  and  the 
exchange  rate  remains  fixed  at  e.  When,  in  contrast,  the  gold  stock  falls  to 
the  critical  level,  the  central  bank  must  raise  the  official  price  of  gold  to 
is  and  set  a  new  higher  exchange  rate  2.  Only  when  the  stock  of  gold  reaches 
G  does  the  central  bank  repudiate  j$  and  6. 
Rather  than  assume  that  the  critical  level  of  the  gold  stock  is  fixed,  we 
specify  that 
Gt  = dGt_l  (2.6) 
where  d  is  influenced  by  the  level  of  cooperation  between  central  banks.  For 
example,  if  central  banks  are  increasingly  reluctant  to  make  gold  reserve 
loans  to  the  home  country  when  it  experiences  balance-of-payments  deficits, 
7 then  d  >  1. 
C.  The  Probability  and  Magnitude  of  Devaluation 
When  the  central  bank  is  forced  to  devalue,  the  new  official  price  of  gold 
is  and  exchange  rate  2  must  be  viable.  To  be  viable,  these  two  prices  must  be 
set  higher  than  those  that  would  prevail  in  a  floating  exchange  rate  regime. 
If  the  new  exchange  rate  is  set  below  the  floating  rate,  the  central  bank  will 
continue  to  experience  a  fall  in  its  gold  stock.  Thus  the  floating  exchange 
rate  places  a  lower  bound  on  the  value  of  the  new  fixed  exchange  rate. 
To  solve  for  the  floating  exchange  rate,  we  fix  the  central  bank’s  stock 
of  gold  at  Gt  and  combine  (2.1)  through  (2.4)  to  get 
h  = 
t  -aEtz‘+  1 +  (l+a)G 
t  (2.7) 
where  h  q 
t  log[Dt  +  G t.exp(g,)]  -  p  -  Ryt  +  ai:  -  p:  -  wt,  and  et  is  the 
hypothetical  floating  exchange  rate.  Note  that  we  value  the  critical  level  of 
the  gold  stock  at  the  official  price  of  gold  prevailing  before  movement  to  the 
floating  rate  regime  occurs.  This  follows  from  the  assumption  that  reserves 
are  valued  at  book  value. 
To  specify  an  autoregressive  process  for  h  we  assume  that  the  remaining 
t 
exogenous  variables  in  the  model  evolve  according  to: 
y,  =  q-1  +  5,  5,-  NCR $1 
.*  .* 
1  =  1  t  t-l  +  ut  ut-  NO, 0,‘) 
PI  =  P1-i 
Equation  (2.8)  specifies  that  output  follows  a  random  walk;  (2.9)  makes 
foreign  interest  rate  stochastic;  and  (2.10)  specifies  a  constant  foreign 




the h t  =t$+eh  +v 
2  1-l  I  (2.11) 
where:  8,  >  0,  8,  5  1,  and  v  =  au,  -  “5,  -  (We  -  wt  _,).  The  distribution 
t 
over  vt  is  given  by  the  normal  pdf  f(v)  with  a  zero  mean  and  standard 
deviation  0”.  Notice  that  8,  is  conditional  on  the  policy  parameters.  For 
example,  if  b  <  1  and  d  =  1,  then  Cl2 <  1  and  h t  is  mean-reverting. 
Solving  the  difference  equations  (2.7)  and  (2.1 l),  we  obtain  the  floating 
exchange  rate  G  t 
(2.12) 
where  p  =  l/[(l  +  a)  -  cte2i.l l  Because  the  behavior  of  the  floating  rate  is 
determined  by  the  path  of  h t’  this  latter  variable  determines  the  viability  of 
the  current  parities. 
The  impact  of  different  policies  on  the  viability  of  the  current  fixed 
exchange  rate  can  be  discussed  in  the  context  of  (2.12).  For  example,  a 
shrinking  deficit  (b  <  1)  with  a  fixed  critical  level  of  gold  reserves  (d  =  1) 
takes  pressure  off  of  the  current  fixed  exchange  rate  because  h  and  Gt  fall  t 
over  time.  In  contrast,  continually  expanding  deficits  (b  >  1)  with  a  fixed 
critical  level  of  gold  reserves  (d  =  1)  causes  ht  to  be  nonstationary  and  puts 
the  current  fixed  exchange  rate  under  ever  increasing  pressure.  Finally,  a 
fixed  government  deficit  along  with  reduced  cooperation  between  central  banks 
which  continually  raises  the  home  central  bank’s  critical  level  of  gold 
reserves  (d  >  1)  makes  ht  nonstationary  and  puts  the  current  fixed  exchange 
rate  under  increasing  pressure. 
The  policy  rule  for  devaluation  implies  that  the  new  fixed  rate,  3 t’  is  a 
mark-up  over  the  floating  given  by  (2.12).  That  is,  when  the  gold  stock 
reaches  Gt  the  central  bank  sets  the  new  fixed  rate  as: 
9 :,  =  G,+  6v t  (2.13) 
where  6  is  a  nonnegative  parameter.  The  devaluation  rule  specifies  that  the 
central  bank  will  select  a  new  fixed  exchange  rate  equal  to  the  minimum  viable 
rate  plus  a  mark-up  dependent  on  the  magnitude  of  the  disturbance  that  forced 
devaluation.  The  logarithm  of  the  new  official  price  of  gold  implied  by  this 
exchange  rate  is  G$  =  e^ +  &. 
Given  the  model,  we  can  describe  the  world  as  being  in  one  of  two  states 
at  any  point  in  time.  State  one  occurs  at  t+j  (st +  j  =  1)  when  devaluation 
does  not  take  place.  State  two  occurs  at  t+j  (st +  j  =  2)  when  devaluation 
takes  place.  The  probability  of  being  in  state  one,  based  on  information 
available  at  time  t,  is  pr(s 
t+j  =  l),  and  the  probability  of  being  in  state 
two  is  pr(s 
t+j  =  2)  =  1  -  pr(s,+  j  =  1). 
The  probability  of  devaluation  a  time  t+l  based  on  information  available 
at  t  is  equal  to  the  probability  that  the  fixed  rate  at  t+l  will  exceed  the 
fixed  rate  at  t 
=  pr(v,+I  > k,>  (2.14) 
where  k  =  [e 
t 
t  -  (l+a)@t-  Cle,h,]/(C(+S).  Thus  agents  assign  a  probability  to 
the  event  that  devaluation  will  occur  one  period  in  the  future  given  knowledge 
of  the  density  function  f(v)  and  k t’ 
Our  objective  in  the  next  subsection  is  to  derive  the  variance  of  i 
1+1 
conditional  only  on  information  available  at  time  t.  To  do  so,  both  E tet  +2 
and  Etet+l  need  to  be  derived.  To  simplify  the  analysis,  we  assume  that 
agents  know  with  certainty  that  devaluation  will  not  occur  at  t+l,  i.e., 
10 pr(st+l  =  1) =  1,  and  focus 
probability  of  devaluation  at 
on  time-t  information  is 
on  devaluation  uncertainty  for  t+2. 
12  Given  a  zero 
t+l,  the  probability  of  devaluation  at  t+2  based 
P’@t+,  =  2) = pr(vtc2 > Etkt+l)  (2.15) 
where  Etkt+t  =  [et+t  -(l+o)~et  -  Pe,er  -  PQ,I/(P+Q 
We  can  also  solve  for  the  magnitude  of  devaluation.  Focusing  on  the  state 
of  the  world  two  periods  into  the  future,  we  get 
E,(e,+2 1  st+2=  1)  = et+, 
and 




where  E,(v,+~  Is~+~=  2)  = 
I 
vf(v)dv 
Etk  t  +l 
Thus  the  expected  exchange  rate  in  t+2  when  devaluation  is  known  to  occur  is  a 
function  of  the  models  underlying  parameters. 
Finally,  we  can  combine  the  expressions  in  (2.16)  and  (2.17)  with  the 
probability  of  devaluations  to  get  the  conditional  (conditioned  only  on  the 
information  set  and  not  on  the  state)  expectation  for  the  exchange  rate  two 
periods  hence 
Etet+*  =  pr(st+2=  l)+6t+l  +  pr(st+2=  2)-Et(~t+21st+2=  2)  (2.18) 
This  equation  shows  that  the  expected  exchange  rate  is  an  increasing  function 
of  the  probability  of  devaluation.  This  link  between  credibility  and  the 
expected  exchange  rate  has  important  implications  for  the  conduct  of  monetary 
11 policy  because  it  implies 
initiate  large  increases  in 
equilibrium. 
that  reduced  credibility  forces  the  central  bank  to 
domestic  interest  rates  to  restore  money  market 
D.  Endogenous  Interest  Rate  Uncertainty 
Given  the  existence  of  devaluation  uncertainty  for  t+2,  it  is  easy  to  show 
that  the  conditional  interest  rate  variance  can  be  expressed  as: 
13 
Var  i 
t  t+l  =  Et  Vart(it+l  s~+~ 
[  ’  )I +  vart  Et(it+l  %+2  [  ’  )I 
(2.19) 
where  Et  and  Var t  are the  expectation  and  variance,  respectively,  conditional 
only  on  the  time  t  information  set,  while  Et (.  1  st +2)  and  Var t  (. 1  st +2) are the 
expectation  and  variance,  respectively,  conditional  on  the  time  t  information 
set  and  the  state  of  the  world  at  t+2. 
As  we  demonstrate  in  the  appendix,  the  conditional  variance  for  the 
interest  rate  can  be  written  as: 
Var  i  - 
t  t+l  - 
<  +  [Et(Gt+2  Ist+*=  2)  -  $+l]Tpr(st+2  =  Dpr(st+,  =  2)  (2.20) 
Equation  (2.20)  illustrates  that  two  main  factors  contribute  to  interest 
rate  uncertainty.  First,  uncertainty  increases  when  the  variance  of  foreign 
interest  rates  shocks,  CT:, rises.  Large  shocks  to  foreign  interest  rates 
produce  dramatic  adjustments  in  the  domestic  money  stock  to  restore 
equilibrium  with  fixed  exchange  rates  and  this  raises  uncertainty  about 
interest  rates. 
Second,  interest  rate  uncertainty  arises  as  an  endogenous  response  to 
reduced  credibility  of  central  bank’s  commitment  to  the  exchange  rate  regime. 
When  the  current  fixed  exchange  rate  is  completely  credible,  agents  place  zero 
probability  on  devaluation,  pr(st+*  =  2)  =  0,  and  uncertainty  is  driven  only 
by  the  variance  of  foreign  interest  rate  shocks.  As  the  current  fixed  rate 
12 becomes  less  credible,  the  probability  of  devaluation  rises  above  zero, 
pr(5  +2  =  2)  >  0,  and  uncertainty  rises  above  the  level  which  prevails  under 
perfect  credibility.  Finally,  as  agents  become  certain  that  devaluation  will 
occur,  pr(st+*  =  2)  +  1,  uncertainty  is  once  again  driven  solely  by  the 
variance  of  foreign  interest  rate  shocks.  Thus  there  is  a  nonlinear  concave 
relation  between  conditional  interest  rate  variance  and  the  probability  that  a 
discrete  devaluation  will  take  place. 
To  illustrate  the  endogenous  nature  of  interest  rate  uncertainty  in  this 
model,  suppose  that  the  policy  authorities  de-emphasis  external  balance  and 
emphasize  internal  balance.  That  is,  a  path  of  rapid  deficit 
in  order  to  fight  recession  regardless  of  the  impact  that  this 
central  bank’s  gold  stock.  This  shift  in  policy  causes  b,  8 
2 
growth  is  chosen 
has  on  the 
and  p  to  rise 
and  Etkt+l  to  fall.  The  net  impact  is  that  pr(s,  +2  =  2)  rises.  As  long  as 
the  probability  of  devaluation  does  not  rise  beyond  S,  interest  rate 
uncertainty  increases.  Thus  increased  emphasis  on  internal  balance  raises 
interest  rate  uncertainty  by  undermining  the  credibility  of  the  current 
exchange  rate  parities. 
As  a  second  example,  consider  the  impact  of  reduced  cooperation  among 
central  banks.  When  cooperation  is  reduced  individual  central  banks  cannot 
count  on  foreign  central  banks  to  lend  them  gold  reserves  during  balance-of- 
payments  crises.  In  the  context  of  the  model,  this  has  the  effect  of  raising 
the  parameters  d,  O2 and  l.~ which  makes  ht  nonstationary  and  raises  the 
probability  of  devaluation.  Thus  a  breakdown  in  international  cooperation  can 
also  raise  interest  rate  uncertainty  by  undermining  the  credibility  of  the 
current  exchange  rate  parities. 
Finally,  an  unexpected  unilateral  devaluation  by  a  foreign  central 
causes  interest  rate  uncertainty  to  rise.  When  a  foreign  central  bank 
bank 
raises 
the  price  at  which  it  buys  and  sells  gold  (e.g.,  j$  rises),  et+  1  falls  which 
13 leads  to  a  reduction  in  E  k  t  t+ 1  and  an  increase  in  the  probability  that  the 
home  country  will  devalue.  Thus  by  devaluing,  foreign  central  banks  can  cause 
the  credibility  of  the  home  country’s  commitment  to  the  current  parities  to 
fall  and  interest  rate  uncertainty  to  rise. 
III.  Measuring  Interest  Rate  Uncertainty 
The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  construct  a  measure  for  interest  rate 
uncertainty.  To  measure  interest  rate  uncertainty  we  use  the  autoregressive 
conditional  heteroscedasticity  (ARCH)  model  pioneered  by  Engle  (1982):  The 
basic  idea  is  to  specify  a  time-series  model  for  the  interest  rate  and  to 
associate  the  conditional  variance  of  the  model’s  error  term  with  the  level  of 
interest  rate  uncertainty  experienced  by  economic  agents.  If  the  conditional 
variance  clusters  intertemporally,  then  the  model’s  disturbances  have 
autoregressive  conditional  heteroscedasticity. 
As  Bollerslev,  Chou  and  Kroner  (1992)  point  out,  an  observationally 
equivalent  representation  of  the  ARCH  model  is  the  time-varying  parameter 
moving-average  model.  We  follow  Bera,  Higgins  and  Lee  (1992)  and  specify  the 
following  linear  time-varying  parameter  model  as: 
i 
t  =  a  +  pIi,_,  +  .  .  . 
k 
E  =  E 
t  IQ  jt  t-J 
+  Ut 
j=l 
h  = 
t  var(y  IR,J  = 
where  it  is  the  tth observation  of  the 
+  Q_”  + et  (3.1) 
k 
= 
o2 +  t 
j=l 




interest  rate,  a  is  a  constant,  and  the 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
p  are  autoregressive  coefficients. 
1  The  disturbance  at  follows  a  stochastic 
k-order  autoregressive  process  with  +j  constant,  q j t  stochastic  for  all  j  and 
U 
t 
-  N(0,  0’)  a  finite-variance  homoscedastic  error  process.  The  two  error 
14 processes  are  assumed  to  be  independent.  Furthermore,  E(IJ,)  =  OkX  1  and 
E(q,q  2  =  Z  where  TJ,  =  (TJ~~,..., q,  J’.  To  simplify,  we  assume  that  IS is  a 
diagonal  matrix. 
The  conditional  variance  of  the  disturbance  E,  is  given  in  (3.3).14  The 
information  set  at  t- 1,  Q t _  1,  includes  all  past  disturbances  (et  _ 1  ,...  E 
‘-9 
) 
and  variances  (h t _  1  ,..., h t _  p).  The  conditional  variance  is  specified  in  a 
flexible  manner  so  that  both  ARCH  and  generalized  ARCH,  or  GARCH(p,q),  models 
can  be  estimated.  An  ARCH  error  process  exists  when  the  variances  of  the 
stochastic  component  of  the  autoregressive  parameters  in  (3.2),  the  q j t,  are 
nonzero.  These  variances  make  up  the  diagonal  of  I;.  Thus  C  +  0  and  yj  #  0 
are  equivalent. 
As  Bera  et  al.  (1992)  point  out,  it  is  important  to  consider  the 
possibility  that  serial  correlation  and  conditional  heteroscedasticity  exist 
in  the  model  simultaneously.  This  is  because  conditional  heteroscedasticity 
can  be  mistaken  for  autocorrelated  disturbances.  The  model  (3.1)-(3.3)  allows 
us  to  simultaneously  test  for  the  presence  of  autocorrelated  errors  and  time- 
varying  conditional  variances. 
Testing  for  ARCH  entails  testing  whether  or  not  the  autoregressive 
coefficients  are  time-varying.  This  is  equivalent  to  testing  the  null 
hypothesis  Ho:  yj  =  0.  The  Lagrange  multiplier  statistic  for  testing  this 
hypothesis  in  the  presence  of  autocorrelation  is  denoted  LMARCH  1  AR .  This 
statistic  is  calculated  as  the  number  of  observations  (N)  multiplied  by  the 
R-squared  (R2)  from  the  regression  of  tt  on  (1,  t2 
t  - 1  “..’  c2 
‘-9 
),  with 
A 
” 
Et =  i  - & - 1 filli,_, 
A  k/t/l 
and  U  = 
t 
j=l 
t  t,-  pa& 
j=l 
j  t-l 
where  hats  over  parameters  denote  that  they  are  maximum  likelihood  estimates. 
The  L”ARCH  I AR  statistic  is  distributed  asymptotically  as  x2  with  q  degrees  of 
freedom.  Clearly,  the  validity  of  the  test  is  conditional  on  proper 
15 specification  of  the  AR  process. 
To  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  autocorrelation  (Ho:  ej  =  0)  under  the 
assumption  of  a  particular  form  of  ARCH,  we  construct  the  Lagrange  multiplier 
statistic  denoted  by  LMAR 1  mCH.  Under  the  null  hypothesis,  the  model  reduces 
to  one  with  only  ARCH  disturbances  where 
A  n 
Et  =  it  - & - 1 B,i,_,  and 
j=l 
Then 
iit=  G2+ t 
j=l  ‘;jq_j 
L”AR  1  ARCH  =  t  Jjx 
Nl 
0 
t  &.I ,...*  t,J(t,_,  ,...*  :,_, -: 
NL  A 
)I (I: 
F;  E&Et _  1’“” 
t=l  t  t=l  t 
t  -2) 
which  is  distributed  asymptotically  as  x2  with  k  degrees  of  freedom.  The 
validity  of  this  test  is  conditional  on  the  proper  specification  of  the  ARCH. 
To  construct  the  ARCH  models  we  use  yields  on  three-month  Treasury 
securities  from  the  Banking  and  Monetary  Statistics.  We  use  the  yield 
available  in  the  third  month  of  the  quarter  to  obtain  quarterly  observations 
for  this  series.  Figure  1  illustrates  this  yield  (TBILL)  over  the  interwar 
period  along  with  the  federal  Reserve’s  discount  rate  (DISCOUNT).15 
Table  1  shows  results  from  specification  tests  for  various  ARCH(q)  and 
GARCH(p,q)  models.  The  specification  of  equation  (3.1)  employed  is  the  simple 
univariate  autoregressive  model  with  n=l.  For  autoregressive  errors  of  order 
zero,  one  and  two  we  report  LMARCH  1  AR  in  Section  A  of  Table  1.  The  results 
indicate  that  for  all  orders  of  the  AR  process  considered  and  for  q  running 
from  one  to  six  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  Ho:  y,  =  y2  =  . .  .  =  yg 
=  0.  Therefore  there  is  strong  evidence  of  an  ARCH  process  in  the  interest 
rate  innovations.  Also,  the  long  lag  structure  in  the  conditional  variance 
16 equation  suggests  that  the  parsimonious  GARCH  model  is  appropriate. 
Section  B  of  Table  1  reports  results  for  tests  of  the  null  hypothesis  of 
no  autocorrelation,  Ho:  $t  =  9,  =  .  .  .  =  9,  =  0  under  different  assumptions 
about  the  order  of  the  ARCH  and  GARCH  models.  In  all  cases  but  one  we  cannot 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  autocorrelation  in  the  disturbances.  This 
finding  suggest  that  the  time-varying  conditional  variances  are  not  generated 
by  autocorrelated  disturbances. 
Table  2  reports  estimates  for  the  GARCH(  1,l)  model.  This  model  is 
preferred  over  the  ARCH  model  because  of  the  efficient  use  it  makes  of  the 
data  series.  Also,  this  model  out  performs  the  other  GARCH  models  in  that  its 
individual  coefficients  are  more  highly  significant.  Interestingly,  the 
likelihood  ratio  statistic  at  the  bottom  of  Table  2  allows  us  to  reject,  at 
extremely  high  levels  of  significance,  the  null  hypothesis  that  y, +  h,  =  1. 
In  fact,  the  linear  combination  of  these  two  parameters  is  much  higher  than 
one  suggesting  that  conditional  variances  follow  an  IGARCH  process  (see  Engle 
and  Bollerslev  (1993)).  Thus  shocks  to  the  conditional  variance  are  highly 
persistent  and  affect  uncertainty  over  all  future  horizons. 
IV.  The  Historical  Record 
Section  II  showed  that  domestic  interest  rate  uncertainty  is  a  function  of 
the  credibility  of  the  exchange  rate  regime.  Moreover,  we  discussed  how  the 
latter  is  influenced  by  shifts  in  domestic  monetary  and  fiscal  policy, 
breakdowns  in  cooperation  between  central  banks,  and  unilateral  devaluations 
by  foreign  central  banks.  This  section  examines  the  historical  record  to 
determine  whether  there  is  evidence  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  was  driven 
by  these  events.  Our  focus  is  on  the  dramatic  rise  and  fall  in  uncertainty 
which  occurred  during  the  1932  to  1934  period.  16 
17 A.  Britain’s  Departure  from  the  Gold  Standard 
The  gold  standard  began  to  collapse  during  the  international  financial 
crisis  of  1931.  The  crisis  began  in  May  of  193 1  with  the  failure  of  Credit 
Anstalt,  the  largest  private  bank  in  Austria,  and  quickly  spread  to  Germany  by 
July  of  1931.  The  crisis  brought  about  a  cessation  of  international  lending 
and  the  German  central  bank  responded  by  shifting  to  an  expansionary  policy  so 
that  constrained  domestic  borrowers  could  obtain  credit.  The  result  was  a 
massive  withdrawal  of  highly  mobile  foreign  deposits  which  forced  Germany  to 
suspend  convertibility  into  gold  and  impose  foreign  exchange  restrictions. 
The  crises  quickly  spread  to  Britain  and  by  the  Fall  of  1931  the  country’s 
balance-of-payments  began  a  rapid  deterioration  as  a  result  of  debt  defaults 
and  deposits  frozen  in  closed  European  banks.  As  devaluation  rumors  spread, 
capital  began  to  flow  out  of  Britain  unchecked  by  the  Bank  of  England.  The 
Bank  hesitated  to  raise  the  Bank  rate  due  to  the  damage  such  a  move  would 
likely  inflict  on  the  already  depressed  economy.  The  unwillingness  to  raise 
interest  rates  resulted  in  Britain’s  quick  decision  to  abandon  the  gold 
standard  on  September  20,  1931. l7  By  the  end  of  October,  a  total  of  15 
countries  had  left  the  gold  standard. 
Several  scholars  have  argued  that  Britain’s  departure  from  the  gold 
standard  represented  a  major  event  which  affected  expectations  about  future 
U.S.  policy  toward  gold.  For  example,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963)  conclude 
that  there  was  widespread  fear  that  the  U.S.  would  follow  Britain  and  abandon 
the  gold  standard  and  that  foreign  holders  of  U.S.  assets  began  to  convert 
their  assets  into  gold.  18  Eichengreen  (1992)  provides  a  similar  assessment. 
He  argues  that  countries  such  as  the  U.S.  which  remained  on  gold  in  1931  were 
threatened  by  gold  reserve  losses  and  convertibility  crises  because  their 
commitment  to  the  gold  standard  regime  became  less  credible.  Moreover,  these 
18 countries  could  not  expect  assistance  from  foreign  central  banks  (i.e.,  by 
loosening  their  credit  conditions  or  by  making  short  term  loans  to  the  country 
in  crisis)  because  of  the  breakdown  in  international  cooperation  among  central 
banks. 
To  maintain  gold  reserves  and  currency  convertibility  in  the  face  of  a  run 
on  the  dollar,  the  Federal  Reserve  responed  to  the  events  of  late  1931  by 
pursuing  a  restrictive  monetary  policy.  On  October  9,  1931  the  Federal 
Reserve  increased  the  discount  rate  from  lln  percent  to  21n  percent,  then  to 
31n  percent  on  October  16.  According  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz,  this  was  “the 
sharpest  rise  within  so  brief  a  period  in  the  whole  history  of  the  System, 
before  or  since”.  19 
The  description  of  the  expectational  environment  in  late  1931  provided  by 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  and  Eichengreen,  along  with  the  behavior  the  Federal 
Reserve,  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model  presented  in  section  2.  By 
raising  the  Sterling  price  of  gold,  the  Bank  of  England  forced  an  appreciation 
of  the  dollar.  This  action  raised  the  probability  that  the  U.S.  would  devalue 
(see  equation  2.15)  and  reduced  the  credibility  of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the 
gold  standard.  The  reduced  credibility  raised  the  expected  exchange  rate  (see 
equation  2.18)  and  forced  the  Federal  Reserve  to  raise  short-term  interest 
rates  to  a  much  higher  level  -  relative  to  the  case  where  existing  parities 
were  credible  -  in  order  to  restore  money  market  equilibrium.  Thus  the 
loss  of  credibility  generated  by  Britain’s  devaluation  explains  why  the 
Federal  Reserve  was  forced  to  initiate  such  a  dramatic  increase  in  the 
discount  rate. 
The  loss  of  credibility  also  explains  why  domestic  interest  rate 
uncertainty  rose  so  rapidly  at  the  end  of  1931.  When  the  dollar  strengthened 
in  response  to  devaluation  of  the  Sterling,  reduced  credibility  was  exported 
to  the  U.S.  and  this  should  have  increased  conditional  interest  rate  variances 
19 of  investors  (see  equation  (2.20)).20 
B.  Expansionary  Monetary  Policy  in  1932  and  1933 
Another  event  which  may  have  contributed  to  interest  rate  uncertainty 
following  Britain’s  departure  from  gold  was  the  aborted  shift  in  U.S.  monetary 
policy  in  1932.  According  to  Epstein  and  Ferguson  (1984),  the  Federal 
Reserve,  under  pressure  from  Congress,  backed  off  its  emphasis  on  external 
balance  and  began  conducting  open-market  purchases  between  February  and  June 
of  1932.  Eichengreen  (1992,  pp.  3 15-316)  discusses  how  this  movement  towards 
a  reflationary  policy  was  followed  by  a  drain  of  gold  reserves  from  the  U.S. 
as  investors  began  to  fear  devaluation.  Once  the  open-market  purchases  were 
ceased  in  mid  1932,  the  fear  of  devaluation  was  reversed. 
Figure  2  shows  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  rose  rapidly  during  the 
first  part  of  1932  when  the  open-market  operations  began  and  fell  towards  the 
middle  of  1932  when  the  expansionary  policy  was  aborted.  The  behavior  of  this 
series  is  consistent  with  the  model  discussed  above;  a  shift  towards  internal 
balance  (a  rise  in  b  and  6,)  should  reduce  the  credibility  of  the  existing 
parities  and  raise  the  level  of  interest  rate  uncertainty. 
21  Once  the  policy 
was  reversed,  the  credibility  of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  gold  standard 
should  have  risen  and  interest  rate  uncertainty  should  have  declined. 
Expansionary  monetary  policy  in  the  U.S.  may  have  also  contributed  to  the 
increased  interest  rate  uncertainty  in  early  1933  shown  in  Figure  2.  Wigmore 
(1987)  has  argued  that  expansionary  monetary  policy  in  early  1933  fueled 
expectations  of  devaluation  of  the  dollar.  This  expectation  led  to  a  capital 
flight  from  the  U.S.  and  by  March  4  the  New  York  Federal  Reserve  bank’s  gold 
stock  had  fallen  by  60  percent  in  less  than  one  month.  According  to  Wigmore, 
the  March  1933  Banking  Holiday  was  called  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  implement 
a  suspension  of  gold  convertibility. 
20 C.  The  U.S.  Leaves  the  Gold  Standard 
Following  the  Bank  Holiday  the  Roosevelt  administration  made  it  illegal 
for  U.S.  residents  to  hold  gold.  Several  months  later,  at  the  end  of  January 
1934,  President  Roosevelt,  under  the  authority  of  the  newly  passed  Gold 
Reserve  Act,  specified  a  fixed  price  of  $35  per  ounce  of  gold,  a  59.06  percent 
rise  in  the  official  price. 22  While  official  devaluation  took  place  in  January 
of  1934,  a  number  of  scholars  have  argued  that  market  participants  anticipated 
this  event  many  months  in  advance.  For  example,  Temin  and  Wigmore  (1990) 
conclude  that  devaluation  of  the  dollar  actually  began  in  April  of  1933  and 
was  the  “single  biggest  signal  that  the  deflationary  policies  implied  by 
adherence  to  the  gold  standard  had  been  abandoned...”  and  that  the  policy 
change  was  “clearly  articulated  and  understood”  as  the  dollar  fell  against  the 
pound  by  over  100  percent  in  the  last  eight  months  of  1933.23 
At  first  glance,  the  dramatic  decline  in  interest  rate  uncertainty  during 
the  second  half  of  1933  might  appear  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis 
that  market  participants  anticipated  devaluation  at  this  time.  However,  as  we 
saw  in  equation  (2.20),  a  rise  in  the  probability  of  devaluation  increases 
interest  rate  uncertainty  only  up  to  a  point.  When  the  probability  of 
devaluation  rises  above  fifty  percent,  interest  rate  actually  begins  to 
decline.  Thus  the  finding  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  began  to  decline 
well  before  the  official  devaluation  suggests  that  market  participants  were 
confident  that  the  U.S.  would  leave  the  gold  standard  as  early  as  mid  1933. 
Moreover,  once  it  was  made  illegal  for  U.S.  citizens  to  hold  gold,  the  link 
between  international  developments  and  U.S.  interest  rates  was  greatly 
diminished.  Thus  the  variability  of  shocks  to  foreign  interest  rates  no 
longer  should  have  influence  uncertainty  about  domestic  interest  rates. 
Figure  2  suggests  that  interest  rate  uncertainty  was,  in  fact,  low  for  the 
21 remainder  of  the  inter-war  period. 
To  summarize,  the  departure  from  the  gold  standard  at  the  end  of  1933 
marked  the  end  of  a  turbulent  period  of  transition  in  U.S.  monetary  policy 
which  began  in  1931.  We  have  argued  that  this  transition  was  characterized  by 
a  high  level  of  interest  rate  uncertainty  as  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the  gold 
standard  became  less  credible.  With  the  transition  complete  and  credibility 
of  the  new  regime  established  by  early  1934,  interest  rate  uncertainty  all  but 
disappeared  and  the  stage  was  set  for  expansion  out  of  the  Great  Depression. 
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V.  Interest  Rate  Uncertainty  and  Economic  Activity 
A.  Uncertainty-Augmented  Monetary  Models 
To  examine  the  degree  to  which  interest  rate  uncertainty  can  explain  the 
fluctuations  in  economic  activity  during  the  inter-war  period,  the  GARCH 
variable  is  introduced  into  two  different  monetary  models  for  the  U.S. 
economy.  One  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  monetary  variables  provide  a 
parsimonious  control  for  the  general  state  of  the  economy.  Another  advantage 
of  this  approach  is  that  it  allows  us  to  compare  the  explanatory  power  of 
interest  rate  uncertainty  with  that  of  monetary  conditions. 
To  explore  the  dynamic  relationship  between  economic  activity,  monetary 
conditions  and  interest  rate  uncertainty,  unrestricted  vector  autoregressions 
(VARs)  are  estimated.  The  equation  for  the  economic  activity  variable,  y , , 
from  the  VARs  takes  the  following  form: 
4 
Alog  =  a  +  [  biAlog(yt  _  i>  +  f  ciAlog(xt  _  ;I  +  i  diAGARCHt  _i  +  ut  (5.1) 
i=l  i=i  i=l 
where  x 
t-i  is  a  measure  of  monetary  conditions  (possibly  a  vector);  GARCH 
t-1 
is  the  conditional  interest  rate  variance;  a,  b.,  c.  and  di  are  coefficients; 
1  1 
and  ut  is  an  error  term.  To  avoid  econometric  problems  associated  with  using 
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. nonstationary  variables,  each  of  the  series  is  first-differenced.  All  data  is 
quarterly. 
Following  King  (1985)  and  Gordon  and  Veitch  (1986),  two  approaches  are 
used  to  measure  monetary  conditions.  The  first  simply  takes  the  Ml  aggregate 
and  divides  it  by  the  GNP  deflator.  The  second  approach  separates  the  money 
supply  into  the  real  monetary  base  (BASE)  and  money  multiplier  (mm) 
components,  where  the  latter  is  measured  by  taking  the  ratio  of  the  money 
supply  to  the  monetary  base. 25  This  decomposition  of  the  money  supply  allows 
us  to  distinguish  between  the  impact  of  inside  and  outside  money.  This  is  an 
important  distinction  to  make  for  the  interwar  period  given  the  emphasis 
economic  historians  have  placed  on  different  sources  of  disruptions  to  the 
money  supply.  For  example,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963)  have  focused  on  the 
banking  crises  of  the  early  1930s  and  the  impact  they  had  on  the  money 
multiplier  (i.e.,  by  raising  the  public’s  demand  for  currency  and  the  banks’ 
demand  for  reserves).  In  contrast,  Temin  (1989)  and  Eichengreen  (1992)  have 
focused  on  the  impact  that  unsterilized  international  gold  flows  had  on  the 
monetary  base.  If  the  money  multiplier  helps  explain  economic  activity,  then 
support  is  provided  for  the  Friedman-Schwartz  view.  If  the  Temin-Eichengreen 
channel  is  relevant,  then  movements  in  the  monetary  base  should  help  explain 
fluctuations  in  economic  activity. 
The  VARs  include  one  of  five  different  measures  of  real  economic  activity. 
These  are:  1)  gross  national  product  (GNP),  2)  producers’  durable  equipment 
expenditures  (EQUIP),  3)  nonresidential  structures  investment  (NRS), 
4)  durable  consumption  expenditures  (DURC),  and  5)  nondurable  consumption  and 
services  expenditures  (NDURC).  For  a  complete  discussion  of  the  data  series 
used  in  the  VAR  models,  see  Balke  and  Gordon  (1986). 
Results  for  the  economic  activity  equations  are  reported  in  Table  3.  The 
Table  provides  two  statistics  used  to  evaluate  the  forecasting  power  of  the 
23 right-hand-side  variables.  Panel  A  shows  F-statistics  which  tests  the  null 
hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  on  lagged  values  of  a  particular  right-hand- 
side  variable  are  jointly  equal  to  zero.  Panel  B  shows  the  percentage  of 
forecast  error  variance  for  the  economic  activity  variable  that  is  accounted 
for  by  impulses  to  the  right-hand-side  variables  at  the  eight  quarter  horizon. 
The  economic  activity  variable  is  placed  first  in  the  ordering,  the  monetary 
variable(s)  second  (and  third),  and  the  GARCH  variable  last.  Therefore  the 
uncertainty  variable  is  handicapped  relative  to  the  other  variables  in  the 
system. 
The  F-statistics  in  Panel  A  of  Table  3  show  that  the  money  supply,  as 
measured  by  Ml,  has  a  statistically  significant  (at  the  five  percent  level) 
impact  on  real  GNP  and  each  of  the  disaggregated  measures  of  economic 
activity.  When  we  decompose  the  money  supply  into  its  two  components,  the 
monetary  base  has  a  significant  impact  on  each  of  the  five  categories  of 
economic  activity.  In  contrast,  the  money  multiplier  has  a  significant  impact 
only  on  real  GNP,  nonresidential  structures,  and  durable  consumption.  Taken 
together,  these  results  provide  some  evidence  that  unsterilized  gold  flows  and 
the  banking  crises  affected  the  U.S.  economy  during  the  interwar  period. 
The  last  column  of  Panel  A  presents  F-statistics  for  the  GARCH  variable. 
In  both  monetary  models,  the  interest  rate  variance  enters  significantly  into 
the  GNP  equation.  Moving  down  the  rows  of  Panel  A  we  observe  that  the 
F-statistics  are  not  uniformly  high  for  the  different  categories  of  economic 
activity.  The  interest  rate  variance  has  a  strong  statistical  effect  on 
equipment  investment  and  nondurable  consumption  spending,  a  somewhat  weaker 
impact  on  durable  consumption  spending,  and  essentially  no  effect  on 
nonresidential  structures  investment. 
Panel  B  of  Table  3  shows  the  percentage  of  forecast  error  variance  for  the 
economic  activity  variables  that  can  be  accounted  for  by  impulses  to  monetary 
24 and  uncertainty  variables  at  the  eight  quarter  horizon.  The  results  generally 
support  those  in  Panel  A.  That  is,  the  GARCH  variable  explains  about  as  much 
of  the  GNP  forecast  error  variance  as  do  the  monetary  base  and  money 
multiplier  even  though  GARCH  is  placed  last  in  the  ordering.  Moreover,  the 
GARCH  variable  contributes  a  relatively  large  amount  of  explanatory  power  to 
equipment  investment  and  nondurable  consumption  expenditures. 
The  finding  that  the  interest  rate  variance  has  a  stronger  impact  on 
nondurable  consumption  spending  than  on  durable  consumption  is  somewhat 
surprising.  Recent  theoretical  work  predicts  that  expenditures  which  are 
relatively  more  irreversible  and  can  be  delayed  should  be  more  sensitive  to 
uncertainty.  26  Since  these  attributes  seem  to  better  describe  nondurable  good 
expenditures,  theory  suggests  that  they  should  be  more  highly  sensitive  to 
uncertainty.  One  possible  explanation  for  the  finding  to  the  contrary  is  that 
the  categories  of  expenditure  we  have  considered  are  too  broad  and  that  each 
includes  expenditures  that  are  irreversible  and  can  by  delayed.  For  example, 
automobile  purchases  -  a  durable  good  expenditure  -  are  relatively 
reversible  since  autos  have  an  active  secondary  market,  while  clothing 
purchases  -  a  nondurable  good  expenditure  -  are  relatively  irreversible 
since  clothing  cannot  be  easily  resold.  Therefore  it  is  difficult  to  draw 
inferences  about  the  irreversibility  channel  at  this  level  of  aggregation. 
To  summarize,  the  results  in  Table  3  indicate  that  the  conditional 
interest  rate  variance  had  a  strong  influence  on  economic  activity  during  the 
interwar  period.  Moreover,  this  variable  contributes  approximately  the  same 
amount  of  explanatory  power  as  do  the  various  measures  of  monetary  conditions. 
B.  The  System’s  Other  Equations 
An  interesting  issue  to  explore  is  whether  there  is  any  interaction 
between  the  monetary  variables  and  interest  rate  uncertainty.  If  interest 
25 rate  uncertainty  adversely  affects  the  economy  by  reducing  the  level  of 
financial  intermediation,  then  the  GARCH  variable  should  help  to  explain 
fluctuations  in  the  money  multiplier.  This  is  due  to  the  impact  that 
uncertainty  has  on  the  willingness  of  banks  to  make  loans  which  is  reflected, 
to  some  extent,  in  their  demand  for  excess  reserves  and  the  money  multiplier. 
In  contrast,  there  does  not  appear  to  a  strong  reason  to  believe  that  an 
exogenous  change  in  the  money  multiplier  affects  interest  rate  uncertainty. 
Concerning  the  interaction  between  interest  rate  uncertainty  and  the  monetary 
base,  the  theoretical  model  presented  in  section  II  suggests  that  increases  in 
the  domestic  credit  component  of  the  monetary  base  should  lead  to  an  increased 
probability  of  devaluation  and  greater  interest  rate  uncertainty.  However, 
the  increased  probability  of  devaluation  should  also  lead  to  a  flow  of  gold 
out  of  the  U.S.  which  reduces  the  monetary  base.  Thus  the  net  effect  is  that 
fluctuations  in  interest  rate  uncertainty  are  not  necessarily  associated  with 
movements  in  the  monetary  base. 
Table  4  shows  F-statistics  and  variance  decompositions  from  the  monetary 
variable  and  interest  rate  equations.  An  interesting  finding  to  emerge  from 
Table  4  is  that  the  GARCH  variable  has  a  very  significant  impact  on  the  money 
multiplier,  while  strength  of  the  feedback  effect  from  the  money  multiplier  to 
the  GARCH  variable  is  much  weaker.  This  finding  suggests  that  part  of  the 
monetary  contraction  in  the  U.S.  during  the  Great  Depression  may  have  been  due 
to  an  increased  demand  for  liquidity  by  the  banking  system  in  the  face  of 
increased  uncertainty. 
Table  4  also  shows  that  the  GARCH  variable  has  a  significant  impact  on  the 
monetary  base,  while  there  is  little  evidence  of  feedback  from  the  monetary 
base  to  the  GARCH  variable.  The  absence  of  a  feedback  effect  is  consistent 
with  the  discussion  from  above.  In  contrast,  the  strong  effect  running  from 
lagged  values  of  the  GARCH  measure  to  the  monetary  base  is  more  difficult  to 
26 explain.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  exogenous  shocks  to  interest  rate 
uncertainty  affect  the  U.S.  gold  stock  and  monetary  base  by  influencing  the 
desire  by  investors  to  hold  U.S.  financial  assets.  The  model  in  Section  II 
could  be  easily  altered  to  incorporate  this  type  of  effect. 
B.  Alternative  Models for  GNP  Components 
To  evaluate  the  robustness  of  our  findings  to  alternative  specifications, 
we  estimated  VAR  models  that  included:  1)  the  growth  rate  of  one  real  GNP 
component,  2)  real  GNP  growth,  3)  the  first-difference  of  the  three-month 
Treasury  bill  yield,  and  4)  the  first-difference  of  the  GARCH  variable.  These 
models  are  motivated  by  two  considerations.  First,  a  considerable  amount  of 
empirical  research  has  shown  that  accelerator  models,  which  focus  on  the  role 
of  lagged  changes  in  output  or  sales,  do  a  good  job  of  explaining  aggregate 
investment  spending.  27  Similar  types  of  results  have  been  documented  for 
consumption  spending.  Second,  it  is  possible  that  the  GARCH  variable  does  a 
good  job  of  explaining  economic  activity  only  because  it  is  picking  up 
movements  in  the  level  of  interest  rates.  By  including  both  the  interest  rate 
and  the  GARCH  measure  we  can  determine  the  extent  to  which  this  is  the  case. 
Table  4  reports  results  for  the  economic  activity  equations  from  these 
models.  Panel  A  of  Table  4  shows  that  none  of  the  variables  appear  to  explain 
nonresidential  structures  investment,  while  only  GNP  has  a  significant  impact 
on  durable  consumption  spending.  28  In  contrast,  the  GARCH  variable  is  highly 
significant  in  both  the  equipment  and  nondurable  consumption  equations  with 
F-statistics  well  above  the  one-percent  critical  values.  The  variance 
decompositions  in  Panel  B  show  the  same  result.  The  GARCH  variable  explains 
over  20  percent  of  the  forecast  error  variance  for  both  equipment  expenditures 
and  nondurable  consumption  spending.  Finally,  the  results  do  not  support  an 
empirical  link  between  lagged  movements  in  the  interest  rate  and  variations  in 
27 the  GNP  components. 
The  findings  in  Table  4  provide  additional  evidence  that  there  is  a  strong 
link  between  interest  rate  uncertainty  and  economic  activity  during  the 
inter-war  period.  The  finding  that  the  GARCH  variable  continues  to  provide  a 
high  level  of  explanatory  power  even  when  short-term  interest  rate  is  included 
in  the  models  suggests  that  the  former  is  not  important  simply  because  it  is 
a  proxy  for  the  level  of  interest  rates.  While  the  finding  that  lagged  GNP 
does  not  contribute  a  great  deal  to  explaining  variation  in  equipment 
investment  appears  to  clash  with  previous  empirical  work,  this  result  might  be 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  accelerator  effect  is  being  picked  up  by  lagged 
values  equipment  expenditures.  Overall,  the  finding  that  the  GARCH  variable 
continues  to  have  a  strong  impact  on  equipment  expenditures  even  though  lagged 
equipment  expenditures  and  GNP  are  included  in  the  models  provides  strong 
evidence  of  the  contractionary  impact  of  uncertainty  on  investment  spending 
during  the  interwar  period. 
VI.  Conclusion  and  Policy  Implications 
One  of  the  benefits  associated  with  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  is  that 
they  reduce  uncertainty  facing  export-producing  firms.  However,  if  this 
reduction  in  exchange  rate  uncertainty  increases  uncertainty  somewhere  else  in 
the  system,  then  it  is  not  clear  that  the  benefits  of  fixed  exchange  rates 
outweigh  the  costs. 
This  paper  argued  that  the  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates  erected  under 
the  inter-war  gold  standard  introduced  significant  interest  rate  uncertainty 
into  the  U.S.  economy  during  the  1930s.  Moreover,  this  uncertainty  rose  in 
response  to  a  breakdown  in  credibility  of  the  regime  and  had  a  significant 
impact  on  aggregate  income.  Thus  the  experience  from  the  Great  Depression 
suggests  that  the  costs  of  maintaining  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  can  be 
28 very  large  indeed,  especially  when  the  regime’s  credibility  diminishes. 
This  paper  has  important  policy  implications  because  it  suggests  that  the 
utility  of  a  particular  policy  is  strongly  influenced  by  its  credibility. 
Moreover,  policy-makers  can,  to  a  limited  extent,  control  the  credibility  of  a 
policy.  For  example,  economic  theory  and  experience  suggest  that  unilateral 
pursuit  of  expansionary  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  lead  the  public  to 
anticipate  devaluation  which  undermines  the  credibility  of  the  fixed  exchange 
rate  regime.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  fundamental  incompatibility  between 
maintenance  of  fixed  exchange  rates  and  expansionary  policies  undertaken 
independent  of  the  policies  of  other  countries.  Thus  it  is  vital  that  fixed 
exchange  rate  regimes  be  accompanied  by  international  cooperation  and  that 
expansionary  policies  be  pursued  on  a  multilateral  basis.  If  cooperation  is 
not  forthcoming,  the  positive  effects  of  expansionary  policies  will  be  offset 
by  a  loss  of  credibility  and  increased  uncertainty. 
The  findings  of  this  paper  also  offer  some  perspective  on  the  recent 
debate  over  the  need  for  a  quasi-fixed  exchange  rate  regime  in  Europe.  The 
convergence  of  macroeconomic  policies  mandated  by  the  European  Monetary  Union 
(EMU)  has  forced  many  central  banks  to  pursue  tight  monetary  policy  and  peg 
their  exchange  rates  within  narrow  bands.  This  monetary  straight  jacket  has 
had  an  unexpectedly  severe  impact  on  the  European  economy  with  unemployment 
reaching  very  high  levels.  This  outcome,  along  with  the  exchange  rate  crises 
of  late  1992,  has  caused  an  increasing  number  of  academic  economists  to 
question  the  necessity  of  a  pegged  exchange  rate  system. 
29 
The  debate  over  the  exchange  rate  regime  in  Europe  has  largely  ignored  the 
credibility  question.  The  perspective  provided  by  this  paper  suggests  that 
breakdown  in  the  credibility  of  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  (ERM)  may,  through 
its  impact  on  uncertainty,  be  an  important  factor  contributing  to  the  economic 
contraction  in  European  .  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  true  costs  of  the  ERM 
29 exceed  those  brought  about  by  the  contractionary  stance  of  monetary  policy 
called  for  by  adherence  to  the  ERM.  Without  a  full  accounting  of  these  costs, 
a  proper  evaluation  of  the  optimal  policy  regime  cannot  be  made. 
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Given  the  two-state  nature  of  the  devaluation  uncertainty,  equation  (2.19) 
can  be  written  as 
2 
Vartit+l  =  C Var,(i 




Et(i  t+l  1 s,+~=  2)  -  Et  (it+l  1 s,+~=  1) 
I 
yprbt+2=  1 >.pr(st+2=  2)  (A.11 
The  first  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of  (A.l)  is  the  expectation,  over  the 
two  states,  of  the  interest  rate  variances  conditioned 
I 
or  not  devaluation  occurs  at  t+2.  The  second  term 
two  states,  of  the  expected  interest  rate  conditioned 
or  not  devaluation  occurs  at  t+2. 
on  knowledge  of  whether 
is  the  variance,  over  the 
on  knowledge  of  whether 
Given  (2.2),  (2.17)  and  (2.18),  we  can  solve  for  the  components  of  (A.l): 
and 
Et(i 
t+l  Is~+~=  1)  =  i: 
Et(it+l  Is  t+2 = 2) = i: +  E*(G 
t+2  Is~+~=  2)  -  e 
t+l 
Var(i+t  Is~+~=  1) = Et  - Et(it+l  I  s,+~=  1)  2  Is~+~=  1  1  =d  ” 
vart(it+,  Is~+~=  2) = Et  0 it+l - Et(it+l  Is~+~=  2) 2  Is~+~=  2  1  1 =< 
Inserting  these  expressions  into  (A.l)  gives  us  equation  (2.20). 
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Conditional  Variance  of T-Bill  Rate,GARCH(l,l) 
1920  1922  1924  1926  1928  1930  1932  1934  1936  1938  1940 Table  1 -  Specification  Tests 
Panel  A:  Testing  for  ARCli 
LM 
ARCH(AR 
(1922:2  - 1940:4) 
U(l)  J4==(2)  m(3)  J==(4)  m(5)  m(6) 




21.09  21.26***  21.13  23.11*** 
AR(l)  10.14*** 
***  *** 
22.01  28.58  18.80***  18.58***  23.45*** 
12.97*** 
***  *** 
AR(P)  25.25  24.69  27.01***  29.44***  24.77*** 





(1922:2 - 1940:4)  (1922:2 - 1940:4) 
AR(l)  m(2)  J=(l)  i-(2) 
ARCH(l)  .60  3.09  ===(l,l)  2.44  2.51 
m(2)  .67  1.66  GARcHG,l)  2.43  2.62 
m(3)  .Ol  .66  _(1,2)  1.21  1.26 
A===(Q)  3.07*  3.08  cARcH(l,l)  1.45  1.52 
m(5)  .25  .28 
m(6)  1.65  1.66 
NOTE:  I& 
ARCH[AR 
is distributed  asymptotically  as x2 with m degrees  of freedom 
where m is the order of the ARCH  process.  Likewise,  LM 
ARtARCH 
and LM 
are distributed  as x2 
ARIGARCH 
with k degrees  of freedom where  k is the order of the AR 
process.  Statistical  significance  at the l%, 5% and 10% level are given by 
***  **  ,  ,  and * respectively. Table  2  -  GAFUI  Model  Estimates 
Re8ult8  for G?SCH(l,l) 
(1920:3 - 1940:4) 
Parameter  x Variable  Parameter  Asymptotic  Asymptotic 
Estimate  Standard  Error  t Ratio 
01  constant  0.0001  0.00023  0.45 
Y,-l 
*** 
0.986  0.005  196.00 
r  constant  0.00000045  0.00000024  1.82  0 
1.140  0.323  3.53*** 
Alht-l  0.453  0.075  6.00*** 
log Likelihood  value: 
likelihood-ratio  statistic  for IGARCH(x2t11  1: 




Statistical  significance  at the l%, 5% and 10% level are given by  ***, **, and 
* respectively. Table  4 - Results  for Monetary  and Interest  Rate Uncertainty  Equations 
Sample:  1921:3  - 1940:4 





Alog(GNP)  Alog  Alog(BASE)  AGARCH 
Alog  (mm)  .86  .96  .37  7.08*** 
Alog(BASE)  .39  1.79  4.25***  3.56** 
AGARCH  .48  2.47*  1.37  8.92*** 
Panel B: Decomposition  of Variances  (8 quarter  Horizon) 
Alog  (nun)  16.3  57.4  4.0  22.4 
Alog(BASE)  11.1  32.1  44.4  12.4 
AGARCH  5.9  13.6  10.3  70.1 
Notes:  Estimated  Regressions  use  four  lags  of  each  variable.  All  variables 
are  in  1972  dollars  except  for  the  money  multiplier  and  GARCH  estimates  of 
interest  rate  variances.  Statistical  significance  at  l%,  5%  and  10%  level 
are  given  by  ***,  **,  and  * respectively. Table  5 - Uncertainty-Augmented  Output-Interest  Rate Models 
for Real GNP Components 
Sample:  1921:3  - 1940:4 






Alog(GNP)  ASTR  AGARCH 
1.51  .51  4.30*** 
Alog(NRS)  1.08  .31  .56 
ALog(DURC)  4.80***  .44  1.76 
ALog(NDURC)  1.43  .65  5.27*** 
Panel B: Decomposition  of Variances  (8 quarter  Horizon) 
Alog(EQUIP)  9.8  0.1  20.5 
Alog(NRS)  7.1  2.6  4.9 
ALog(DURC)  14.6  4.2  5.7 
ALog(NDURC)  9.2  3.7  23.5 
Notes:  Estimated  Regressions  use  four  lags  of  each  variable.  All  variables 
are  in  1972  dollars  except  for  the  interest  rate  and  the  GARCH  estimates  of 
interest  rate  variances.  Statistical  significance  at  l%,  5%  and  10%  level 
are  given  by  ***,  **,  and  * respectively. Table  5 - Uncertainty-Augmented  Output-Interest  Rate Models 
for Real GNP Components 
Sample:  1921:3  - 1940:4 






Alog(GNP)  ASTR  AGARCH 
1.51  .51  4.30*** 
Alog(NRS)  1.08  -31  56 
ALog(DURC)  4.80***  -44  1.76 
ALog(NDURC)  1.43  5.27*** 
Panel B: Decomposition  of Variances  (8 quarter  Horizon) 
Alog(EQUIP)  9.8  0.1  20.5 
Alog(NRS)  7.1  2.6  4.9 
ALog(DURC)  14.6  4.2  5.7 
ALog(NDURC)  9.2  3.7  23.5 
Notes:  Estimated  Regressions  use  four  lags  of  each  variable.  All  variables 
are  in  1972  dollars  except  for  the  interest  rate  and  the  GARCH  estimates  of 
interest  rate  variances.  Statistical  significance  at  l%,  5%  and  10%  level 
are  given  by  ***,  **,  and  * respectively. Footnotes 
1  This  literature  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  large  literature  which 
focuses  on  domestic  forces.  For  example,  the  well  known  argument  of  Friedman 
and  Schwartz  (1963)  is  that  the  banking  crises  of  1930  and  1931  lowered  the 
money  multiplier  by  raising  the  public’s  demand  for  currency  and  banks’  demand 
for  reserves.  The  resulting  fall  in  the  stock  of  money  combined  with  a  stable 
money  demand  function  then  led  to  the  unprecedented  fall  in  income.  Along 
somewhat  different  lines,  Bernanke  (1983)  emphasizes  the  impact  of  the  banking 
crises  on  the  level  of  financial  intermediation. 
2 See  Kindleberger  (1973)  for  a  discussion  of  this  view. 
‘Prices  rose  by  about  one  hundred  percent  during  the  war  in  the  U.S.,  but 
increased  by  approximately  150  percent  in  Britain  and  200  percent  in  France. 
4See  Dernburg  (1989,  p.  386)  for  a  summary  of  this  view. 
5 In  contrast,  Eichengreen  argues  that  the  prewar  gold  standard  was  credible 
because  the  public  was  confident  that  policy  would  be  conducted  to  maintain 
balance-of-payments  equilibrium  at  the  existing  exchange  rate  parities.  This 
confidence  was  driven  by  the  distribution  of  political  power  that  favored 
groups  which  preferred  external  balance  (i.e.,  bankers)  over  groups  which 
preferred  internal  balance  (i.e.,  labor).  Thus  the  prewar  gold  standard  was 
insulated  from  domestic  political  pressure  and  this  increased  its  credibility. 
Also,  the  existence  of  good  international  relations  meant  that  foreign  central 
banks  were  willing  to  lend  gold  to  countries  whose  reserves  came  under  attack 
and  coordinate  multilateral  monetary  expansions.  This  cooperation  reinforced 
the  regime’s  credibility  since  it  meant  that  “commitment  was  international, 
not  merely  national.”  Eichengreen  (1992,  p.  8). 6 Not  only  did  the  contractionary  domestic  monetary  policy  depress  domestic 
demand  directly,  but  an  indirect  effect  as  well  because  the  shifting  of 
contractionary  policy  abroad  caused  exports  to  decline.  Nevertheless,  the 
initial  driving  force  was  the  change  in  the  policy  stance. 
7See  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  and  Williamson  (1987). 
‘See  Robert  Pindyck  (1991)  and  Dixit  (1992). 
9 Other  studies  have  also  explored  the  role  that  uncertainty  played  in  driving 
economic  activity  during  the  Great  Depression.  However,  these  studies  focus 
exclusively  on  the  stock  market  crash  of  October  1929  as  a  source  of  income 
uncertainty.  See  Romer  (1990),  and  Flaco  and  Parker  (1992). 
“This  includes  public  debt  held  by  the  central  bank  and  private  debt  held  by 
the  banking  system. 
“It  is  assumed  that  a0J(l  +  a)  <  1  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  speculative 
bubbles. 
12  By  making  this  assumption  we  reduce  the  number  of  states  in  the  model  from 
four  to  two  without  altering  the  basic  findings. 
13See  Evans  and  Wachtel  (1993). 
14  Note  that  hL  is  being  used  to  represent  a  different  variable  in  this  section. 
15  While  the  adjusted  interest  rate  series  contained  in  Cecchetti 
a  more  precise  measure  of  Treasury  bill  yields  (i.e.,  they  have 
“exchange  privilege”  value),  this  data  limits  our  analysis  to  the 
(1988)  provide 
been  purged  of 
1929  to  1940 
sample.  Because  the  Banking  and  Monetary  Statistics and  Cecchetti  series  are 
highly  correlated,  use  of  the  former  should  not  adversely  affect  the  analysis. ‘!For  the  sake  o f  brevity,  we  do  not  discuss  the  behavior  of  interest  rate 
uncertainty  during  other  periods.  However,  there  is  evidence  that  reduced 
international  cooperation  may  have  contributed  to  the  uncertainty  in  other 
periods.  For  example,  the  rise  in  interest  rate  uncertainty  during  1930 
occurred  at  a  time  when  there  was  a  great  deal  of  international  conflict  about 
trade  issues.  In  fact,  Sumner  (1992)  has  argued  that  the  large  decline  in 
stock  prices  during  June  of  1930  resulted  from  “a  major  tariff  fight  [the 
Smoot-Hawley  tariff]  in  the  U.S.  Congress”  and  “stories  reporting  threats  of 
reprisals  from  various  nations.”  It  is  also  possible  that  domestic 
developments  may  have  contributed  to  interest  rate  uncertainty.  For  example, 
Eichengreen  (1992)  has  argued  that  political  conflict  and  changing  leadership 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  is  partially  responsible  for  the  financial  market 
turmoil  of  the  late  1920s. 
17For  a  more  detailed  chronology  of  these  events,  see  Temin  (1989),  pp.  65-73. 
18Friedman  and  Schwartz,  (1963)  p.  316. 
“Faced  with  the  potential  of  large  capital  outflows,  members  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  unanimously  concluded  on  November  30,  1931  that  the  outlook 
too  uncertain  to  permit  long-term  policy  formulation  and  that  they  should  only 
discuss  policies  applying  to  the  end  of  the  year.  See  Chandler,  American 
Monetary  Policy,  p.  178. 
20 Eichengreen  (1990)  shows  that  the  volatility  of  exchange  rates,  inflation 
rates  and  real  interest  rates  rose  substantially  following  Britain’s  departure 
from  the  gold  standard  in  September  of  1931. 
was 21 Eichengreen  (1992,  p.  315)  and  Temin  and  Wigmore  (1990)  argue  that  economic 
activity  continued  to  decline  during  1932  in  the  face  of  monetary  expansion 
because  industrialists  expected  that  there  would  be  a  reversion  to 
deflationary  policies  once  the  Congress  adjourned  in  July  and  pressure  was 
removed  from  the  Federal  Reserve.  An  alternative  explanation  is  that  the 
increased  uncertainty  generated  by  the  policy  shift  offset  the  stimulative 
effect  of  the  open-market  purchases. 
22See  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963,  p.  469). 
23 Others  have  argued  that  there  was  a  great 
or  not  official  devaluation  would  take  place. 
and  Ferderer  and  Zalewski  (1993). 
241t  is  interesting  to  note  that  Romer  (1992) 
deal  of  uncertainty  about  whether 
See  Eichengreen  (1992,  p.  344) 
attributes  the  expansion  out  of 
the  Great  Depression  to  monetary  stimulus  provided  by  gold  inflows  into  the 
U.S.  The  behavior  of  interest  rate  uncertainty  during  the  second  half  of  the 
1930s  suggests  that  reduced  uncertainty  may  have  also  played  a  role. 
25 Because  we  are  estimating  the  models  in  first-differences  of  logs,  the  growth 
rate  in  the  real  monetary  base,  Alog(BASE),  and  the  growth  rate  of  the  money 
multiplier,  Alog(  are  introduced  separately  into  the  models.  This  is  the 
approach  use  by  King  (1985). 
26 See  Pindyck  (1991)  for  a  discussion  of  this  issue. 
27See  Clark  (1979). 
28 Gordon  and  Veitch  have  also  shown  that  spending  on  nonresidential  structures 
is  largely  exogenous. 
29See  the  General  Discussion  (p.  136)  in  Eichengreen  and  Wyplosz  (1993). 